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Abington Memorial Hospital began its journey to create a culture of safety in December 1999 and today in
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our strength of commitment to continuous improvement in search of perfect care for our patients.
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 ABSTRACT 
 
 
 The Institute of Medicine (IOM) reports in 1999, To Err is Human – 
Building a Safer Health System and 2001, Crossing the Quality Chasm sought to 
transform the culture of American hospitals.  The culture of blame needed to 
become a culture of safety if we were ever to reduce and prevent errors and 
create a system of care organized around patient not provider needs. 
 
 Abington Memorial Hospital began its journey to create a culture of safety 
in December 1999 and today in 2010 we continue that journey.  Much has been 
done and our organization has truly advanced in our transparency and focus on 
systems improvement.  This paper describes our journey over the past decade 
and our strength of commitment to continuous improvement in search of perfect 
care for our patients. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 In December 1999 the Institute of Medicine (IOM) published To Err is 
Human – Building a Safer Health System.  A wake-up call for American 
Healthcare, this document claimed that approximately 98,000 people each year 
were killed in U.S. hospitals because of healthcare workers’ errors.  These errors 
included, for example, medication problems, falls and procedures.  There were 
also errors in judgment, knowledge deficits, and some lapses in thinking.  Many 
people in healthcare contested the data, but no one could refute the overall 
premise.  It was assumed that error had become acceptable in hospitals in large 
part because human beings are not perfect.  We all make mistakes; therefore, 
there will be errors in healthcare.  However, the IOM report changed that 
paradigm.  It argued that with a systems approach, “care processes” could be 
designed to reduce many of the human errors in healthcare. 
 At Abington Memorial Hospital (AMH), a number of us read the report.  
We immediately accepted the basic premise that systems designed for safety 
would dramatically reduce the number of errors.  This was because since 1991, 
Lucian Leape and his colleagues had been assiduously documenting the need 
for a systems approach to manage healthcare errors and particularly, medication 
errors, before the watershed IOM report was published.  Table 1 summarizes 
some of the milestone events. 
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Table 1.  Medical Errors Documented Sequence 
 
1991 - Lucian Leape, MD and 9 co-authors from the Harvard School of  
  Public Health, published a study in the New England Journal of  
  Medicine about the nature of adverse events in hospitalized   
  patients. 
 
1994  - Boston Globe Reporter, Betsy Lehman died from a chemotherapy  
  overdose at the Dana Farber Cancer Institute in Boston.  
 
1995 -  Lucian Leape, MD and 18 co-authors published a study in JAMA  
  about a systems analysis of adverse drug events. 
 
1997 - Lucian Leape, MD testified before Congress about hospital errors. 
 
1998 - IOM Quality of Health Care in America Committee was formed to  
  develop a strategy that would result in a threshold improvement in  
  the quality of healthcare over the next 10 years.  
 
1999 - IOM Report To Err is Human was released. 
 
  
 In the early 1990’s, the press began to focus on individual errors and the 
Boston Globe ran a series on medical errors focusing on how errors could be 
prevented and the lack of regulatory oversight of hospital quality.  The Globe 
used 2 years of the Massachusetts Department of Health (DOH) data of 
significant hospital incidents reported to the DOH.  The series highlighted Betsy 
Lehman’s death in 1994.  
 In September 1999, the Philadelphia Inquirer (Gerlin, 1999) ran a series 
written by Andrea Gerwin describing medical errors, focusing on how errors 
could be prevented, and the lack of regulatory oversight of hospital quality.  The 
Inquirer used malpractice claims data for MCP Hospital obtained from Allegheny 
bankruptcy court documents.  The series highlighted individual malpractice 
cases. 
  
 3
 Both newspapers focused on the sensationalism around very disturbing 
cases of serious injury or death to innocent patients.  Hospitals, administrators, 
and physicians wanted to do the right thing, improve care and reduce errors but a 
culture of safety requires transparency.  The press and the trial lawyers also 
wanted transparency but also to provoke and punish those providers involved in 
errors.   
 At AMH, we set out to learn as much as we could as quickly as we could 
about this field.  We pursued two routes:  individual self-study, and group study 
through guest lectures, conferences and grand rounds.  I began my own course 
of study with a review of the literature regarding accident theory. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
ACCIDENT THEORY 
 
 The Industrial Revolution was enabled in part with fossil fuel driven 
technology.  This allowed production of massive amounts of electric power, 
harnessing natural forces, and technology involved in nuclear power, unleashing 
nature’s force through manipulation of the atomic structure.  Each of these 
sources of energy has its own set of risks and complications.  Each could have 
devastating effects on the surrounding environment and people as the energy 
source is extracted from nature.  The changes that resulted can be understood 
as due to the complexity and coupling of the technologies that evolved.  In a 
linear relationship, such as a production line, products, services, people and 
processes are added one at a time.  In a complex enterprise, multiple, 
simultaneous steps occur with no opportunity for anyone to see or follow all of 
the actions at one time.  Complexity is beyond one’s cognitive limits to process 
simultaneously. 
 The mechanisms that we have developed to assist us in producing, 
processing and creating output have become increasingly sophisticated.  We 
have evolved from using rudimentary computers that were sophisticated 
typewriters and adding machines to microchips that can process and synthesize 
information far more efficiently than can the human mind.  It is important to say 
that humans have created computers.  We design them, build them, repair them, 
improve them, manage them, and they now can do many but not all tasks 
beyond human capability.  They are faster and have greater memory capacity.  
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Computers have transformed our lives but they also have transformed our 
designs.  To stretch, to grow, to reach new levels we have taken our basic linear 
designs and created tightly coupled, very complex designs driven by computer 
technology to create outputs far greater than our traditional methodologies.  For 
example, compare a coal-fired furnace designed to burn fossil fuels and generate 
heat that can be converted to a source of energy to a nuclear power plant that is 
designed to accelerate nuclear particles to create energy that can provide 
electricity for a region.  Both are designed to be managed and maintained by 
humans; but the first is more linear and the second has a more geometric design.  
The key variables that differentiate the two are complexity and coupling. 
 Complexity involves numerous simultaneous and often interacting actions 
that must occur for the output to be obtained.  Coupling is the interconnectivity of 
the actions and the time it takes for one action to trigger the subsequent action.  
Charles Perrow (1999) described these concepts in his book, Normal Accidents.  
He defines high-risk technologies as those that have “catastrophic potential, the 
ability to take the lives of hundreds of people at one time, or to shorten or cripple 
the lives of thousands or millions more.”  Perrow describes high-risk technologies 
such as nuclear power plants, chemical plants, space missions, dams, nuclear 
weapons, and genetic engineering. 
 Perrow (1999) presents the theory that interactive complexity and tightly 
coupled designs will inevitably produce accidents (errors).  Given the design, he 
argues, these accidents are normal.  Failure is expected to occur since nothing is 
perfect.  What Perrow articulates is similar to James Reason’s (2008) concept of 
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the Swiss Cheese Model (Reason, 1991) of error.  Both purport that systems 
(including medical processes) involve multiple steps that are interconnected.  A 
failure in one part of the process may be insignificant, even trivial, but when 
various parts fail, the cumulative failures can be catastrophic.  It is the interaction 
of the multiple failures that explains the accident.  The concept is particularly 
relevant in healthcare.  Perrow (1999) notes, “Small failures abound in big 
systems.  Reconstruction of patient accidents reveals the banality and triviality 
behind most catastrophes” (p. 9).  Perrow describes the difference between 
“transformation” process and “additive” process.  He notes, “Transformation 
systems are those where we cannot see what is going on; we generally know 
what works but not necessarily why.  These systems are vulnerable to small 
failures that propagate unexpectedly because of complexity and tight coupling” 
(Perrow, 1999, p. 10). 
 One of the lessons of complex systems theory is that any part of the 
system might be interacting with other parts in unanticipated ways (Perrow, 1999, 
p. 21).  It is the unexpected interactions of a small failure in the system that 
makes it prone to a system accident (Perrow, 1999, p. 61) which he defined as 
an unintended and untoward event.  Complex interactions suggest that there are 
branching paths, feedback loops, jumps from one linear sequence to another 
because of proximity.  The connections are not only adjacent and serial, but can 
multiply as other parts, units, or subsystems are reached.  Only 1% of all 
possible parts or units in a linear system are capable of producing complex 
interactions, while 10% of those in a complex system are capable of doing so, 
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that 10% represents more than a tenfold increase in the potential for system 
accidents (Perrow, 75). 
 Perrow specifically defines linear interactions as those in expected and 
familiar production or sequence and those that are visible even if unplanned.  
Complex interactions are those of unfamiliar sequences of unplanned, 
unexpected sequences and are not visible or not immediately comprehensible 
(Perrow, 1999, p. 78). 
 The transformation process is a change in physical state and is often 
discovered through trial and error.  Generally it refers to systems that transform 
raw materials, rather than fabricate or assemble parts of a system.  Recombinant 
DNA technology, nuclear technology, and chemical plants involve transformation 
processes.  Complex systems are described as systems with the characteristics 
noted in Table 2. 
Table 2.  Perrow’s System Characteristics 
− Proximity of parts or units not in a production sequence; 
− Many common mode connections between components not in a production 
sequence; 
− Unfamiliar or unintended feedback loops; 
− Many control parameters with potential interactions; 
− Indirect or inferential information sources; 
− Limited understanding of some processes. 
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 The characteristics in Table 2 (Perrow, 1999, p. 85-86) describe modern 
healthcare.  The interactions and interconnectivity of subsystems within the 
human body do not always act as one would predict.  The use of pharmacology 
to treat the human conditions is known to work but not always clearly understood 
as to how it works.  Even more complex than the human body, which works in 
harmony, the care systems in hospitals are complex with many connections 
between medications, procedures, and patients and providers with varying 
interests.  There are innumerable interactions not in a production sequence and 
with unintended feedback loops.  Medical errors are a consequence of this 
complexity and our limited understanding of how all the subsystems interconnect. 
 I believe, these new systems are an outgrowth of our sophistication in 
designing more effective and efficient systems.  Patients used to stay in the 
hospital 10 days on average.  Now it is 4 – 5 days because we simultaneously 
treat their multiple conditions rather than sequentially treating and observing their 
healing process related to the treatment interventions.  In our effort to increase 
our efficiency (less time) and effectiveness (better results) we have created 
unintended interactions and consequences as we simultaneously medicate and 
perform invasive procedures.   
 A more frightening yet exciting technology such as gene splicing has high 
risk.  Scientists use enzymes to cut DNA into pieces and recombine the pieces 
with the DNA of a carrier or a vector.  The recombined molecules are inserted 
into a host where they reproduce.  One benefit is that human growth factors that 
were carried by a host bacteria could help treat children with growth disorders.  
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The concern arises when the unrestrained application of these techniques is 
considered.  That is to say, the creation of a bacterial or viral vector that helps in 
one set of circumstances, could also be devastating if that vector creates an 
unexpected reaction and replicates beyond the scope of the original treatment.  A 
viral, uncontrollable vector carrying growth factors could create a potent, lethal 
organism that potentially could be carcinogenic to humans.  This is dangerous 
technology with tremendous opportunity to help patients; yet the uncertainty of 
understanding every mechanism involved in transformational, complex systems 
can result in accidents (Perrow, 1999, p. 297). 
 Diane Vaughan (1996) agrees with Perrow that there are inherent hazards 
in complex systems.  She notes that our incremental approach to systems design 
creates an environment where signs of potential danger can be normalized and 
therefore, can have a catastrophic effect (Vaughan, 1996, p. XIV).  She agrees 
that engineering designs are often biased toward optimizing existing hardware to 
“make them” work as opposed to designing something new based on what is 
desired.  Safety is a concern.  Yet, many new designs bring new uncertainties, 
not greater predictability.  As argued in systems theory and supported by my 
experience in hospitals, a change introduced in one part of a system may have 
unpredictable ramifications for other parts (Vaughan, 1996, p. 116). 
 Frederick Taylor’s work introduced scientific management into the 
workplace in the early 20th century.  Taylor believed that “separation of 
conception from execution” created more innovative and efficient designs 
(Taylor, 1911, pg. 26).  Workers lost control over their craft when planning 
  
 10
responsibilities were taken from the individual worker and shifted to managers, 
leaving the worker to follow orders.  Managers were implementing plans without 
access to the full picture (Vaughan, 1996, p. 204). 
 In our efforts to achieve sophistication, we created divisions of specialized 
labor.  This obfuscates individual responsibility for the overall product and 
creates discontinuities.  Many people make decisions but they do not know how 
their actions connect to the actions of others or to the whole.  The Challenger 
catastrophe on January 28, 1986 exemplified the inherent danger in 
incrementalism and discontinuity.  A series of seemingly harmless decisions 
moved NASA toward a disastrous outcome on February 1, 2003 when the Space 
Shuttle Columbia exploded on re-entry (Vaughan, 1996, p. 408 – 409).  These 
tragedies are examples of “system accidents” - multiple failures in interconnected 
subsystems. 
 The question is:  how do we make systems in healthcare safer, reduce the 
risk of accidents occurring while offering advances in care?  One challenge is to 
manage the complexities.  Healthcare and, in particular, hospitals, are systems of 
care that have been incrementally designed.  We change components of the 
system but we seldom redesign the process from start to finish.  Incrementalism 
is inherent in healthcare because medicine is evidence based.  Physicians are 
scientists who try new procedures or medicines and measure the effectiveness of 
the intervention.  This is best measured by controlling for one change at a time 
so that results can be attributed to an intervention.  This is an incremental 
process.  In healthcare, we build upon what we know, what we have experience 
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with.  The goal in systems design is to understand the connections and 
interactions between the parts with more predictive capabilities and to de-couple 
the process enough to build in safety.   
 The airline industry has accomplished this, and we can learn from them.  
The principle of high reliability training is part of the key to the airlines’ success in 
safety improvements.  High reliability teams work together under the auspices 
that anyone can challenge anyone and question anything if they believe safety 
would be impacted.  This creates an environment where all participants are 
trained to observe small system failures that, if unnoticed, could cascade into 
larger failures or accidents.  Each team member observes the system from their 
perspective.  These multiple observers work together to intervene to stop errors 
or accidents from becoming catastrophes. 
 High reliability organizations proffer, according to Vaughn (1996), safety 
as a priority, decentralized decision making, enabling quick, flexible responses; 
intense discipline and training that maximizes uniform appropriate responses by 
those closest to the risk technology (p. 416).  At the core of organizational 
problems are people who need to make decisions or judgments every day.  We 
use our own mental models that reflect and are congruent with our experience 
(Perrow, 1999, p. 27). 
 Probably the best example of an industry that has created systems and 
teams that foster safety is the airline industry.  The Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) is responsible for safety and facilitating air travel.  The 
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), an independent board, conducts 
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investigations and prods the FAA to set new safety requirements.  The Airline 
Pilots Association (ALPA) is a strong union that advocates for safe conditions 
and protests unsafe conditions.  Although this structure provides for a strong 
emphasis on safety, the real advance came in 1975 when the Aviation Safety 
Reporting System (ASRS) was established by the FAA and the National 
Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).  NASA supervises the system as 
an independent entity.  The system guarantees immunity.  No reporters can be 
penalized by the FAA even if they break federal laws (unless criminal activity is 
involved).  Reports are de-identified usually in less than 4 days after an accident.  
Although pilots are still subject to discipline by their airlines, this kind of system 
seems to work.  Reports abound and unsafe conditions are quickly corrected 
(Perrow, 1999, p. 169).  This system incentivizes safety.  These kinds of complex 
regulatory endeavors create a complex web of safety nets. 
 In contrast to the “safety focused” airline industry, the marine industry is 
characterized as an “error-inducing system”, where risky behavior is often 
attributed to the “traditions of the sea.”  Errors in the marine industry are co-
produced by several factors (see Table 3). 
Table 3.  Marine Industry Characteristics 
− Centralized hierarchy headed by the captain; 
− Long hours on duty; 
− Insurance rates not tied to safety; 
− Communication problems – native languages can differ between officers and crews; 
− Crews rotate with each voyage with no incentive to maintain equipment; 
− Nature rules with storms, waves, ice-covered decks, shifting narrow channels and fog (Perrow, 1999,   
p. 175). 
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The authoritarian structure aboard a ship is inappropriate for the complexities of 
today’s sophisticated ships. 
 Medicine probably lies somewhere in between the airline industry and the 
marine industry in its culture of safety.  Fundamentally, safety needs to be 
embedded in the culture of organizations.  It needs to be part of learned 
behaviors, part of the value system, and generally a way of life.  It needs to be 
ever present, permeating all that one does. 
 Healthcare has always been committed to safety because of the nature of 
the work, and because outcomes are often measured in mortality and morbidity.  
Mistakes are a normal occurrence in any work.  Healthcare is no different.  Every 
occupation has its mistake calculus, which is the probability of making a mistake 
and this depends on many factors including skills, frequency of performance, and 
the nature of the task.  Medical work requires risky decision making in a complex 
system for which failure has consequences for human life.  Marianna Paget 
(1988) in her book Unity of Mistakes, characterizes medical work as an activity 
that is exceptional, uncommon,  and strange because it is error-ridden, uncertain, 
and practiced on the human body. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
HEALTHCARE 
 With the complexity and coupling of our increasingly sophisticated 
processes and technologies, small errors can cascade into catastrophes before 
we can anticipate or even see the error unfold.  The challenge for healthcare 
systems and medical providers is to not only create greater safety through more 
in-depth understanding of the multiplicity of interactions in the care process but, 
more important, to design safety prospectively into the care process.   
 Hospitals are the most visible sector of the healthcare system in the 
United States.  There are 5,000 acute care hospitals in this country, and these 
institutions play a central role in their communities.  Like schools, religious 
organizations, and governmental agencies, hospitals are part of the infrastructure 
that interconnect communities.  Doctors, nurses, and others provide care in 
ambulatory settings, but hospitals remain the focal point for the most complex, 
sophisticated, and innovative care.  Hospitals are communities of people that 
bring together a broad range of workers organized to support the complexities of 
the 21st century care process.  Both the technological side of care, referred to as 
“high tech” and the human side of care, called “high touch” are part of this 
enormously complex system of care.  How do these high tech, high touch 
forces/elements contribute to safer care? 
 Since 1999, there has been a great deal of inquiry and study into the 
causes of medical error.  In the 1990s, a series of sentinel events occurred and 
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thoughtful studies emerged (see Table 1), culminating in the IOM’s report To Err 
is Human – Building a Safer Health System. 
 Across the U.S., this report was seen as a call to action.  I have observed 
that our hospital is deeply committed to introspective review of our systems and a 
prioritization of patient safety as the leading edge of quality.  I believe the 
commitment to quality has been the most important contribution modern 
hospitals have made to medicine.  In 2000, patient safety became the focus of 
quality.  In 2001, the IOM issued a second landmark report, Crossing the Quality 
Chasm.  This report was another call for action to improve the U.S. healthcare 
delivery system as a whole, in all its quality dimensions, for all citizens.  
Physician groups, hospitals, and other healthcare organizations operate 
independently, often providing care without the benefit of complete information 
about the patient’s condition, medical history, services provided in other settings, 
or medications prescribed by other clinicians.  The report concluded that the 
current care systems could not adequately do the job.  The linear approach to 
incremental changes as the method for improvement in efficiency and 
effectiveness was not working.  Trying harder would not work.  Redesign of the 
systems of care was what was needed to create an advanced, sophisticated, 
effective and efficient healthcare system for all U.S. citizens. 
 The IOM (2001) report, Crossing the Quality Chasm continued the IOM’s 
focus on systems improvement.  The breadth of recommendations spanned the 
“high tech” realm (evidence-based decision making) to the “high touch” realm 
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(care based on continuous healing relationships).  The bar was raised again for 
health care providers. 
  
 17
CHAPTER 4 
 
HIGH RELIABILITY ORGANIZATIONS /  
 
HIGH RELIABILITY SYSTEMS DESIGNS 
 
 The healthcare industry, hospitals and doctors, responded to the IOM 
Report by beginning to educate themselves about the systems of care,  and how 
redesign could improve safety and quality and approaches to managing risk and 
designs for safety.  Economic pressures in the 1990s had taken much of the 
buffer out of the healthcare system.  Hospitals consolidated into large systems.  
Hundreds of beds were reduced or redistributed to create greater efficiency, and 
redundancies in service offerings were eliminated or significantly diminished.  
The move to a more efficient model took the slack out of the system.  Hospital 
departments had been compartmentalized which created some redundancy, and 
as those excesses were reduced, the system of care became more tightly 
coupled.  The concept of “going solid” occurs when all units are filled and an 
even minor event in one unit may have a major effect on another unit.  Without 
the simplicity and buffering of loose coupling, the system becomes brittle and 
difficult to manage.  Accidents are more likely, more difficult to foresee, and 
harder to recover from (Cook, Rasmussen, 2005, p. 3).  “Going solid” creates 
pressure, and practitioners push beyond the limits of the marginal boundary 
towards the unacceptable performance boundary.  Organizations that operate 
beyond the marginal boundary are “flirting with the margin, which can lead to 
incremental adjustment of the marginal boundary outward.  Relatively fixed 
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marginal boundaries and deliberately restricted operating point dynamics are the 
hallmark of high reliability organizations (HROs)” (Cook, Rasmussen, 2005, p. 3). 
 HROs are characterized by advanced technology requiring specialist 
understanding and high degrees of interdependence requiring generalist 
understanding.  In complex, tightly coupled processes, tight coordination and 
control enhances performance reliability.  One very important strategy for 
reducing the negative effects of complexity and coupling is redundancy.  
According to Roberts (1990), “if things are done quickly, many pairs of eyes 
serve as watchdogs, the many pairs of eyes are a substitute for unavailable time.  
In short, three pairs of eyes should be able to spot a problem that may take one 
pair of eyes longer to detect” (Roberts, 1990, p. 168). 
 Understanding models of safety has become key to advancing a culture of 
safety in hospitals.  Proper resources and continuous re-evaluation of the most 
effective use of resources is essential.  Healthy levels of redundancy or safety 
nets absent wasteful duplication is essential for reliable, safe systems of care.  
The balance between redundant safety nets and wasteful duplication is one of 
the most vexing issues for hospital leadership.  How to deploy limited resources 
in the most effective proportions is an ongoing challenge.  
 The concepts of reliability and systems designed for appropriate 
redundancy that create safety nets to protect patients from errors is the 
fundamental premise that contemporary providers use in creating a culture of 
safety. 
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 James Reason developed the Swiss Cheese Model in 1991 and many 
authors have modified the concept to describe system errors.  R. I. Cook (2005) 
has used the concept to articulate goal conflicts, defenses, and latent failures 
(see Figure 1). 
Figure 1.   Cook’s Model 
 
 
 
 Figure 1 presents how a series of slips or misses due to various pressures 
can lead to a system failure.  In systems there are co-producing forces that 
cause system failure.  It is the culmination and the sequence of slips that 
ultimately results in an accident.  Embedded in this model is the understanding 
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that in a tightly coupled work process errors can compound quickly before they 
can be understood so that a failure can be avoided or prevented.  A review of 
system failures produces hindsight bias.  (See Figure 2).  The source of error is 
clear after it has occurred but not as it is unfolding, otherwise we would interdict 
the process and prevent the error. 
Figure 2.  Hindsight Bias 
 
 At AMH, most of our study of errors revolves around a retrospective 
understanding of incidents and redesign of systems to prevent error or system 
failure, but we have also moved to prospective review and design of new 
programs, procedures, or processes.  We use the Failure Modes and Effects 
Analysis (FMEA) approach (Cohen, pg. 319).  This has proved to be extremely 
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effective in understanding the flaws or weaknesses in our processes before 
patients are treated.  This time consuming process serves as a laboratory for 
study and practice such as simulation and creates a safer process in advance of 
actual implementation. 
 Another very important concept in systems design for high reliability is that 
of “The Sharp End and The Blunt End.”  Traditionally, the care process was the 
purview of the practitioner.  Leadership, administration, and support services 
managed the overall operation and dealt with the physical assets, coordination of 
all work, and support of the caregivers (see Figure 3).  The sharp end is where 
the care is rendered by practitioners.  The blunt end is where resources and 
constraints are generated.  Careful coordination between the two ends is 
essential in a culture of safety (Cook and Woods, 1994).  The blunt end must 
support the providers in the design and resourcing of safe care processes, 
whether that involves training, education, staffing, technology, information 
systems, equipment, space, and emotional support. 
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Figure 3.  The Sharp End and The Blunt End 
 
 AMH has worked very hard to create a culture where we are all 
responsible for safety.  We play different roles but patient safety remains our 
stated primary priority, a core value for our entire organization – the Board of 
Trustees, the medical staff, leadership, our employees, and all the “stakeholders” 
who interact with our hospital are consequently part of the complexity problem.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
CULTURE OF SAFETY 
 
 In this section I describe AMH’s journey to create a culture of safety, a 
journey that will never end but has had progressive successes to date. 
 After the publication of the IOM Report (1999), AMH rededicated itself to 
patient safety.  We believed we had always been committed to creating a 
clinically safe environment for our patients, but the IOM Report was clearly a call 
to action.  It all started with our CEO.  He clearly articulated a vision for our 
hospital, a vision of a safer institution.  He set the stage for what would be our 
journey to create a culture of safety.  We developed a Patient Safety Oversight 
Peer Review Committee (PSOC) in December 1999.  The committee was 
charged with two goals.  First, to establish a systems approach to improving 
patient care and reducing medical errors beyond the existing performance 
improvement program; and second, to gather and review information for the 
purposes of evaluating and improving the quality of healthcare rendered through 
improved patient safety with the ultimate goal of reducing morbidity and mortality. 
 The PSOC was comprised of all of the elected leadership of the medical 
staff, the officers; all of the appointed leadership of the medical staff, the 
department chairs; hospital administration; nursing administration; the directors 
of risk management, performance improvement, clinical information, information 
systems, medical education, and pharmacy; and a trustee.  The committee was 
co-chaired by the Chief of Staff (COS) and the Executive Vice President (COO).  
A subcommittee, the Patient Safety Committee (PSC), was established to 
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provide for greater study and implementation of the Oversight Committee’s goals 
and objectives.  It became evident early on that a Chief Patient Safety Officer 
(CSO) was needed so the Chairman of Medicine who also chaired the Pharmacy 
and Therapeutics Committee, assumed the role of CSO. 
 Our first goal was to consider the appropriate design and use of 
technology to achieve greater safety.  The literature was clear:  universal 
(mandatory) Computerized Physician Order Entry (CPOE) could reduce 
medication errors by 55% - 83% (Bates, 2007, p. 3).  Some of the medical staff 
(40%) used the computer system to enter their orders but the majority (60%) did 
not.  Almost all of the residents (90%) used the computer to enter orders.  We set 
a goal in January 2000 to achieve universal CPOE by January 2001.  The entire 
medical staff, nursing staff, and information systems staff moved into active 
implementation.  There was a clear sense of momentum in the organization.  To 
a person there was a strong drive to accelerate our efforts to achieve the central 
goal of universal CPOE.  The CSO engaged the medical staff to accept the 
values and outcomes.  Many physician opinion leaders, especially the Chief of 
Staff, championed the cause.  The potential benefits were overwhelming:   70% 
reduction in medication errors.  In a hospital with over 40,000 admissions, 
100,000 emergency room visits, 5,200 births and millions of medication doses 
per year, the potential impact of CPOE on patient safety was tremendous. 
 Constant communication and measurement of milestones towards 
achieving the goal were instrumental in building peer pressure to bring all 
physicians on board.  Our Patient Safety Newsletter served as the central 
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communiqué on techniques that were being employed and resources that were 
available to help and train physicians on the clinical computer system. 
 It took a year of intense focus to achieve this goal.  The COS and CSO 
applied continuous peer pressure to capture the attention of every member of the 
medical staff.  Individual meetings, extensive sharing of comparative data about 
who was using the computer for order entry and who was not, and personal 
training and attention was afforded the medical staff by nursing and information 
systems.  “Super users” were available on the nursing units to give physicians 
personal tutorials.  Our CSO wrote personal letters to physicians to articulate the 
value and importance of CPOE for patient safety.  By January 2001, we had 
achieved our goal.  Although much time and effort was spent convincing 
physicians CPOE was valuable and important for patient safety, there was a 
clear mandate that all physicians needed to place all of their orders via the 
computer when they were in the hospital.  The computer was used for 85% of all 
orders and for 99% of medication orders.  This was the best we could hope for 
until our web-enabled technology was installed in 2007 and physicians could 
enter orders into the computer from their homes or their offices.  Accomplishment 
of this goal was a huge success for Abington Memorial Hospital.  Only 5% of the 
hospitals in the country had universal, mandatory CPOE in 2001 and less than 
10% have it today in 2010.  With over 85% of our orders placed directly in the 
computer by the ordering physician, we moved our hospital to a higher level of 
safety.   
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 Once we accomplished universal CPOE, we realized the power of this 
automation as a patient safety tool.  We proceeded to contract with Eclipsys, a 
software vendor, for their full suite of products to ensure full integration of all our 
systems.  Our analysis indicated their clinical system was the most sophisticated 
software for patient safety on the market in 2000.  Warnings and alerts created a 
safety net for patients and providers.  Critical lab values would automatically 
notify the attending physician.  Lab data or drug interactions would appear on the 
computer screen as the physician was placing his/her orders.  Evidence-based 
medicine protocols and templates could be automated to guide clinicians.  The 
Clinical Alert and Decision Support system was originally developed at the 
Brigham and Women’s Hospital in the 1990’s.  CPOE was an internally focused 
project for AMH.  We capitalized on our commitment to quality of care.  We 
needed to make it happen, and we did. 
 Our next major endeavor was to learn from the experts.  In 2000, we 
invited the Institute for Safe Medication Practices (ISMP) into our hospital to 
review all of our medication processes.  They spent three days with us and 
produced a thorough review of opportunities for improvement.  We spent the next 
three years methodically and meticulously implementing the ISMP redesign 
recommendations.  As an authority on medication safety, we distribute the ISMP 
newsletters, which contain the most current research on pharmaceutical and 
medication devices safety to medical staff members and distribute their nursing 
newsletter to our nurses.  We are preparing to distribute the consumer newsletter 
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to our patients.  We review our current systems based on the ISMP studies to 
identify needed system changes. 
 As we came to know the ISMP, we recognized what a truly remarkable 
organization it was.  Our CSO served as a surveyor for them and our COO was 
appointed to the ISMP Board.  We remain committed to learning from the 
experts. 
 Our next major advance in patient safety was to begin to participate in 
every relevant learning collaborative that we could at the local, state, and even 
national level.  We worked with the Healthcare Improvement Foundation (HCIF), 
a collaborative of the Delaware Valley Healthcare Council in Southeastern 
Pennsylvania, and the ISMP, on medication safety.  We worked with the Hospital 
Association of Pennsylvania’s Patient Safety Collaborative.  We worked with the 
Voluntary Hospitals of America Patient Safety Clinical Advantage Program.  We 
organized teams, sent representatives, and tried to learn everything we could to 
enhance our knowledge of patient safety and to share whatever knowledge we 
had.  Our CPOE success was of great interest to other hospitals.  This was all 
part of our research initiative in our journey to create a culture of safety. 
 During this phase in our development, we voluntarily participated in all 
reporting programs that were available to us – MedMARX for medication errors, 
MERIT for medication and medical errors, as well as the State of Pennsylvania 
Act 51 Reporting of Sentinel Events, and State of Pennsylvania Act 13 for 
reporting of all types of events, those that have caused harm as well as those 
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with the potential to cause harm to patients.  We educated our staff about the 
need to report so that we could redesign systems flaws and prevent future errors. 
 We could only correct systems that we discussed and agreed needed to 
be changed.  We modified our incident report form and created a Safety 
Assurance Form changing the intonation of reporting.  This produced a doubling 
in reporting of our “no harm” incidents (those that could have caused harm but 
did not) which allowed us to change systems before errors occurred.  As we 
talked more openly about specific errors, reporting all sentinel or significant 
events to our trustees, we all became more comfortable focusing on systems 
improvement and not individual blame.  This was one of our most difficult 
challenges.  As with many organizations, we tend to focus on parts and are 
defensive about errors which leads us to blame causes on one aberrant 
individual.  We emphasized that we were committed to moving away from the 
traditional linear analytic thinking approach of finding the weakest link that 
caused the error in the process of care.  That weakest link could have been a 
piece of equipment or it could have been a person.  As we moved beyond blame 
and beyond the person, we came to understand our problems as systemic and 
as having many co-producing, interacting causes.   To formalize our commitment 
to redesigning systems not focusing on people, we developed a Culture of Safety 
Policy which articulated our transition to a deeper understanding of the co-
produced causes of error.  This new framework of thinking required greater, in-
depth study into how errors occur. 
  
 29
 The more we studied, the more complex the care process appeared.  One 
segment of work was inextricably tied to other sequences of work.  The concept 
of coupling became more evident.  The combination of complexity and coupling 
can be fertile ground for small errors to cascade into a catastrophe before we can 
see the error unfolding.   
 James Reason’s (2008) Swiss Cheese Theory illustrates a model of 
medical errors:  one small error after another can snowball into a tragic accident.  
Our goal was to create nets of safety throughout our processes to prevent small 
errors from accumulating into sentinel events that cause real harm to patients.  
Education of all clinical employees and the medical staff was important to 
identification of near misses, accidents waiting to happen.  When the staff caught 
a minor error before it evolved into a serious error, reporting was usually lacking 
because there was no evidence of harm to the patient. 
 These incidents are fertile ground for system management.  We 
encouraged the staff to report anything that not only caused harm to a patient but 
could have caused harm to patients.  Thanking and even celebrating staff who 
took the time to report issues was one way to encourage more reporting.  We 
located Patient Safety Suggestion Boxes where anyone could report any issue 
anonymously all over the hospital and on our ambulatory campuses.  Employees 
began to share ideas.  Our relentless focus on patient safety reporting system 
changes led to people at all levels becoming more aware of patient safety and 
many began to understand their role in making our hospital one of the safest in 
the country. 
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 Our first priority was to change the framework of thinking about patient 
safety.  Beginning in July 2000, every employee received a copy of our annual 
goals, and each year they would see patient safety as the number one priority.  
We established an Employee Patient Safety Committee.  This committee evolved 
into a robust, energized group of patient safety liaisons, one from each nursing 
unit and each clinical department.  They were interested, excited, open-minded, 
and would soon feel empowered.  Along with their department managers they 
were the patient safety “go to” person for their work unit.  They would share 
information and educate staff as well as absorb information and transmit data to 
those who needed to allocate resources to correct systems.  They were catalysts 
for change.  The CSO chaired the group with one of our nursing directors and 
several senior managers were part of this group so we could support their needs, 
reinforce the importance of their role, and hopefully unleash the grassroots 
energy to create safety awareness at all times. 
 Almost two years into our exploration of patient safety as our number one 
focus, we were accumulating so much data, information, issues, comments, and 
extramural directives and newsletters such as ISMP publications, that we needed 
a better way to prioritize and assimilate the opportunities for improvement.  Our 
Vice President for Professional Services took responsibility for organizing all 
sources of input into an “Integrated Patient Safety Summary Report.”  This report 
would serve as our working document for all sources of patient safety 
opportunities.  The report tracked each stage of every issue:  identification, 
further study needed, team assembled and finally, stages of implementation.  
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Each issue was assigned, tracked and implemented.  Issue after issue was 
addressed.  This was a focused effort to transform ideas and suggestions into 
work routines.  This was where the system changes came to life.  A diligent 
group of professionals from performance assessment, nursing, medical staff and 
administration were dedicated and committed to making our hospital one of the 
safest in the country.  The Vice President for Professional Services, CSO and 
Directors of Nursing provided exemplary leadership and drive. 
 As we continued to try to engage all employees and medical staff to 
become involved, we developed and distributed an AMH Patient Safety 
Handbook to all employees.  The handbook described our culture of safety and 
our reporting and disclosure philosophy.  Each employee was required to read 
the handbook and sign off that they understood the contents.  A Patient Safety 
Plan was developed and distributed to all members of the medical staff 
requesting a signed acknowledgement of their support of the plan.  A Patient 
Safety Award was developed that was to be given to individuals who advanced 
patient safety at AMH. 
 Patient safety awareness was enhanced through distribution of a “Safety 
First” pin to those involved on the various patient safety committees.  A poster 
board display placed in the hospital lobby illustrating patient safety 
accomplishments at AMH further illustrated our commitment to advancing patient 
safety. 
 In the late fall of 2002, we entered a new phase in our development.  We 
won the Delaware Valley Healthcare Council’s first Medication Safety Award for 
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our automated inpatient coumadin management and monitoring program.  This 
recognition by our peer hospitals in Southeastern Pennsylvania was particularly 
meaningful and spurred us on.  At the annual Eclipsys meeting, we won the 
Stellar Award for our work in implementing the Eclipsys clinical system that took 
our automation of safety through CPOE to a new level with the sophistication of 
the Eclipsys software.  Both of these honors pushed us to merge these two 
initiatives to develop a virtual coumadin clinic, a web-based coumadin 
management program for our network of owned physician practices.  We had 
begun to tap the talent within our clinical ranks.  One of our very gifted clinicians 
created the software to merge our inpatient coumadin management program and 
the web-enabled Eclipsys system to take safety into the ambulatory setting.  
Within six months, 70% of our patients were within the therapeutic range up from 
40% prior to automating the monitoring.  For this innovative use of technology to 
support clinicians monitoring patients on coumadin in the ambulatory setting, we 
were recognized as a finalist for the 2003 VHA Leadership Award for Clinical 
Effectiveness for a Single Hospital, and we were awarded the very prestigious, 
2003 John M. Eisenberg Award for Systems Innovation from The Joint 
Commission and National Quality Forum. 
 We wanted to ensure that we could bring evidence based medicine to our 
clinicians and used the literature to guide our processes of care.  Medication 
ordering patterns were modified to create forcing functions not allowing 
physicians to order medications within a certain period of time after ordering 
other medications.  Pharmacists ordered lab tests to ensure appropriate levels of 
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a drug.  We provided handheld devices with medical literature reference software 
to all of our residents. 
 Always focusing on the handoffs (coupling interactions) from one provider 
to another we looked more carefully at the continuum of care that we were part 
of.  As an institution with over 3,000 admissions from skilled nursing facilities 
(SNF) we needed a better tool to perfect the continuum of care from the hospital 
back into the SNFs.  A universal computerized transfer and discharge summary 
was developed that built on our commitment to eliminate errors caused by poor 
penmanship. 
 We developed a system to fax all discharge instructions to primary care 
physicians to enhance communications and continuity of care.  Our inpatient 
nurses developed a program where unit nurses called all discharged patients at 
home 2-3 days after discharge to follow up with patients regarding discharge 
instructions and medications. 
 About this time, we also began to use tools from other initiatives that were 
designed to modify our culture to improve services.  We merged our well-
developed patient satisfaction survey process with patient safety.  We inserted a 
separate survey in our patient satisfaction survey and we collated those results 
ourselves.  The questions queried patients on proper patient identification before 
every interaction, explanation of medications, and overall assessment of safety 
from the patient’s perspective.  The results were tabulated by nursing unit and 
distributed to all units.  This was another tool to assess our effectiveness and to 
engage patients in the safety of their care. 
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 One of our most intriguing initiatives grew out of the professional liability 
crisis in Pennsylvania.  The Pew Charitable Trusts funded “The Project on 
Medical Liability in Pennsylvania.”  One aspect of the Project involved 
communication between caregivers and patients and their families. 
 We were invited to participate with three other hospitals in a Pew study on 
the “Effectiveness of Mediation as a Means of Resolving Disputes and Disclosing 
Errors.”  This study holds great promise as a methodology for understanding and 
communicating errors to patients, families, and hospital staff.  After disclosing, 
apologizing, and explaining an error to a patient or family, mediation can provide 
a means for each party to express what they believe and/or need, and to help 
everyone to move on from the unfortunate situation.  The process of open 
discussion helps both sides to better deal with their sorrow, anger, and 
frustration.  In a particularly litigious state like Pennsylvania, this project was 
particularly challenging.  To date, we have had many successful mediation 
interventions. 
 As we entered calendar year 2003, we once again tried to push ourselves 
to achieve a higher level of effectiveness.  We worked with the VHA to implement 
team training for staff in our obstetrical units and in our Emergency Room.  The 
IOM Report Crossing the Quality Chasm, spoke to the importance of effective 
teamwork and communication among the care team.  This training was designed 
to ensure better teamwork in these high-risk services.  Our CSO became our 
Chief of Staff.  He and our CNO have role modeled a powerful partnership 
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between physicians and nurses training and rendering care to patients as a 
team.   
 In 2003, we were very proud to be nominated one of five finalists for the 
American Hospital Association’s (AHA) newly established Quest for Quality 
Prize.  This qualified us for a site visit from the AHA Quest for Quality Prize 
Survey Team.  This prize is given to the institution that most effectively 
demonstrates a culture of safety throughout the organization.  We rarely look 
forward to surveys but we were genuinely excited about this visit and you could 
sense our enthusiasm and energy for patient safety as we opened our institution 
to the Quality Prize Team.  We were deeply honored when we were notified that 
we had been selected as the 2003 winner of the AHA Quest for Quality Prize.  
This award validated our efforts.  Our passion for patient safety was discernable 
and readily evident to the reviewers. 
 In 2004, our hospital began a very important journey toward nursing 
excellence and empowerment, the Magnet Journey.  The American Nurses 
Credentialing Center (ANCC) is the premier nursing credentialing organization in 
the world.  They review and study hospitals across the country to try to identify 
why certain hospitals produced better, safer care, and lower nursing staff 
turnover rates.  The nursing shortage had become acute in the early 2000s and 
nursing and hospital leaders were looking for strategies to improve their 
organizations’ ability to care for a growing and aging population. 
 The ANCC identified 14 qualities that could be attributed to successful 
nursing departments, and these successful departments were, in turn, part of 
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successful hospitals.  These qualities were identified as the Forces of Magnetism 
(see Table 4). 
Table 4.  Forces of Magnetism 
 Quality of Nursing Leadership 
 Organizational Structure 
 Management Style 
 Personnel Policies and Programs 
 Professional Models of Care 
 Quality of Care 
 Quality Improvement 
 Consultant and Resources 
 Autonomy 
 Community and the Healthcare Organization 
 Nurses as Teachers 
 Image of Nursing 
 Interdisciplinary Relationships 
 Professional Development 
 
 Magnet standards speak to excellence and quality in the care of patients.  
Magnet creates a learning environment, seeks community involvement and most 
importantly, empowers nurses in their role as the primary caregivers for patients 
in a hospital.  This empowerment was an important component of our journey to 
create a culture of safety.  Nurses prided themselves on the care they provided 
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and were responsible for articulating issues that comprised safety and quality.  
They also knew they would be supported by both nursing leadership and 
physician leadership if their challenges or questions were in the name of safety. 
 In 2005, AMH was awarded Magnet accreditation.  We were the 84th 
hospital in the country and fourth in the State of Pennsylvania to achieve this 
important milestone.  We were just reaccredited in 2008.  There are currently just 
over 300 Magnet hospitals in the United States and just under 400 globally.   
 In our pursuit of safety, our nursing information system team came up with 
a very simple but elegant solution to a very vexing problem:  how to effectively 
communicate to patients and their families about all of the tests, medications, 
and consultants that are scheduled for them during their hospital stay.  The 
Patient Daily Summary (Appendix 1) was developed by pulling data from various 
parts of our electronic health record to create a daily schedule of all activities the 
patient can expect.  It is printed, handed to the patient and the patient’s nurse 
discusses the content and answers questions.  The summary includes a brief 
explanation of medications and each test or procedure, including what is involved 
and the purpose of the test.  Family members can review the summary when 
they visit.  The use by the staff of this very simple document and the engagement 
of the patient and family has proven to be a very important communication tool 
for patients and encourages questions from patients and their families.  Our 
nursing information system team felt empowered to find solutions to our 
communication issues.  AMH enabled these employees with grant funding from 
our Innovator’s Circle Program to test their ideas and create a prototype of their 
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Daily Care Plan and to pilot it with patients and families.  It proved to be helpful 
based on feedback from our patients and we then implemented the plan across 
all nursing units for all inpatients.  Once a year the American Nurses 
Credentialing Center (ANCC) awards the Magnet Prize to one organization for an 
innovative approach to better, safer care.  In 2008, AMH was awarded the 
Magnet Prize for our Daily Care Plan.  This was a very special recognition for our 
organization and particularly for our nurses and our clinical information systems 
team.  The Magnet Prize recognized the strength and depth of excellence and 
commitment to safety in our nursing service. 
 In December 2004, the Institute for Healthcare Improvement introduced its 
two-year, 100,000 Lives Campaign with a goal of reducing unnecessary hospital 
deaths by 100,000 by June 2006.  In 2005, AMH joined the campaign with 
individual nurse champions leading each of the six teams supported by a 
physician champion to implement the best practices.  We worked diligently to 
change our care practices and have seen significant improvements after 
implementing these practices (see Table 5). 
Table 5.  IHI 100,000 Lives Campaign 
 Rapid Response Team (MET Team) 
 Preventing adverse drug events 
 Delivering evidence based care for acute MI (heart attack) 
 Preventing ventilator associated pneumonia 
 Preventing central line infections 
 Preventing surgical site infections. 
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One of the most important factors in our adoption of these six best practices was 
widespread education for and commitment from the medical, nursing, and clinical 
ancillary staffs.  Our Chairman of the Board in 2005 was and remains a strong 
proponent of patient safety.  He is also a very generous philanthropist, a retired 
CEO of his family’s very successful business.  He challenged the administrative, 
medical, and nursing leadership to create a safer environment, and he offered to 
fund a small team of leaders, trustees and clinical staff to attend the IHI annual 
conference and to bring back and share information with their colleagues. 
 When the second two-year IHI campaign, 5 Million Lives, was introduced 
in 2006 our Board Chair again provided funding but this time 30 people were able 
to attend the annual IHI conference.  One of those attendees was the prior Chair 
of the Board who had also served as Vice Chair of the Board.  She had served in 
many leadership capacities at the hospital and was an early patient safety and 
quality champion chairing or serving on every safety and quality committee in the 
hospital.  She and the Board Chair provided exemplary leadership in our patient 
safety efforts.  They truly exemplified the values of the 5 Million Lives initiative of 
getting the Board on Board.  Our strong presence at the IHI annual meeting has 
created many more patient safety advocates for these very important behavioral 
process changes.  Every year since, this same generous and very committed 
patient safety advocate has funded 30-35 AMH staff and trustees to attend the 
IHI annual conference.  He moved patient safety to the front of his Board agenda 
devoting 30 minutes to address a specific patient safety issue at the beginning of 
every Board meeting.  The collective experience so many of us at AMH have had 
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at the IHI conference has truly embedded a culture of safety and the need for 
appropriate attention and resource allocation to accomplish the daunting tasks 
before us. 
 In 2006, our Board Chair spoke to one of his colleagues who was on the 
Board of Miriam Hospital in Connecticut.  Miriam Hospital had advanced the 
aviation concept of Crew Resource Management, and so our Chair arranged for 
a team of doctors to visit Miriam Hospital with him.  We subsequently adopted a 
similar model from the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) 
called Team Stepps.  For the past three years, we have assiduously trained our 
nursing staff, our residents, and our physicians.  This two-day training teaches 
the principles of clear and complete communication among the healthcare team.  
Staff are empowered to ask questions when they have any concerns about the 
care provided to patients.  It has been a significant investment of time, energy, 
and funding for the 3,200 individuals who have attended. 
 By 2006, we had accomplished significant training and education.  We 
communicated to all trustees, leaders, physicians, nurses, and staff that patient 
safety was our number one priority.  We now needed an organized structure for 
implementation.  We needed patient safety champions who could catalyze efforts 
everywhere in our inpatient and outpatient hospital services and in our physician 
practices.  Safety needed to be ubiquitous and the challenge was so great that it 
could not be handled in a centralized fashion.  Everyone needed to be a patient 
safety champion or at least knowledgeable about the best practices and 
accountable for delivering safe care.  What we needed was an organizing entity 
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to structure our implementation agenda and enable effective execution of our 
ambitious and overwhelming patient safety agenda. 
 We established the “Center for Patient Safety and Healthcare Quality” 
(CSQ).  We appointed two of our best and brightest clinicians who were also 
educators and members of our faculty.  Our Administrative Director was a clinical 
nurse practitioner and our Medical Director was the Associate Director of our 
Internal Medicine Residency Program and a practicing internist.  One was highly 
organized, gifted communicator and tactically capable of delivering a clinical work 
product; the other was exceptionally creative and skilled at design of systems, 
particularly information systems.  Together, they synthesized energy, intellect 
and creativity.  We integrated processes and procedures related to quality and 
safety and added new staff in an effort to coalesce our clinical safety and quality 
resources in one department with a renewed commitment to accelerate our work 
in creating a culture of safety.  They have successfully gathered data, analyzed 
our performance, introduced best practices, educated our physicians and staff 
and held people accountable to our goals.  They collaborate with staff and collate 
data to keep everyone focused.  With their help and guidance, we have created a 
“no excuses” environment – patient safety is a core value and our number one 
priority.  Everyone is expected to be a positive force in our culture of safety.  The 
center has staffed and been the driving force behind root cause analyses of 
serious safety events as we strive to retrospectively understand the system story 
(what happened), the co-producing or interacting forces, and the resolution (how 
can we prevent this from happening again).  Even more impressive, however, is 
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the work the CSQ has done with Failure Mode Effects Analysis (FMEA) and 
proactive risk assessments.  This is the prospective review, mapping and 
analysis of what could happen, rather than the root cause analysis of what did 
happen.  FMEA is about preventing errors before a service is started or a new 
procedure or device is introduced.  It is painstaking work, but it is so important for 
the prospective design of safe systems.  The CSQ has over the last four years, 
2006 – 2009, performed the activities presented in Figure 4. 
Figure 4 
Abington Memorial Hospital 
Center for Healthcare Safety and Quality 
 
AMH has engaged in an impressive array of very important work that requires 
extreme effort but yields extraordinary results.  To a person, every clinician 
involved thought they knew what they wanted to do as they introduced a new 
service or procedure, and to a person, they complemented the process indicating 
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they learned so much in the process that better prepared them to care for their 
patients safely. 
 A very important component of our safety journey has been to support 
caregivers at the point of care with resources.  The CSQ conducts patient safety 
rounds where trustees, leadership and CSQ staff visit various units or 
departments on all three shifts to meet with caregivers and discuss how they 
care for patients and what unmet needs they may have.  Purposeful patient 
safety rounding includes asking the following questions of clinical staff: 
 What worries you about care on your unit? 
 What is the next accident that could happen on your unit? 
 Tell me what is working well. 
 If you could change something, what would it be, how would you do it and 
why? 
 Do you have the tools and equipment to do your job? 
 Are there any individuals who should be recognized for their commitment to 
safety? 
 The caregivers often tell stories about patients as they communicate new 
processes or needs for change.  This process fosters collaboration and 
understanding between the blunt end of care (leadership/governance) and the 
sharp end of care (clinical caregivers).  It is management’s responsibility to 
operationalize system changes to properly resource and organize safe patient 
care services.  Careful follow-up occurs after the rounds to insure reasonable 
changes are implemented based on the caregivers’ input. 
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 In 2005, we had a very serious event where we mortally injured one of our 
patients.  We disclosed the tragic error to the patient’s wife and we offered 
mediation as a formal way to bring closure for this family.  The family decided to 
donate their compensation to establish a patient safety lectureship at AMH.  This 
was an incredibly generous and proactive, positive gesture on the part of this 
family in the face of their devastating loss.  To this day, I believe they understood 
the deep regret we had in failing to rescue their loved one.  Our Chief of Staff 
was the principal spokesperson for our hospital, and he has the ability to truly 
communicate empathy and remorse and to frame the picture of well-meaning, 
well-trained professionals working in a system that fails the patient.  He knows 
how to sincerely apologize.  I suspect he aged a few years in those several 
months of mediation.  Reliving the death of a loved one or your patient can be 
draining but it can also be a way to heal and hopefully allow people to move 
forward after such a loss.  
 The patient safety lectureship provided a very public venue for AMH to 
remember this patient and the family’s loss while educating our staff about how 
to prevent errors through systems improvement.  Our first speaker in 2005 was 
Jeffrey Cooper, Ph.D.  Each year we invite noted experts to educate us in a day-
long series of lectures and rounds.  We have been so fortunate to have hosted 
several patient safety champions (see Table 6). 
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Table 6.  AMH Patient Safety Lecturers 
 Jeffrey Cooper, Ph.D.  2005 
 David Marx, J.D.   2006 
 Sorrel King    2007 
 Michael Leonard, MD  2008 
 Craig Clapper, P.E.   2009 
 
Each speaker shared new dimensions of safety with us, whether through the 
eyes of an anesthesiologist, biomedical engineer, systems engineer, lawyer, or 
mother.  Their depth of knowledge, commitment, diverse perspective, and 
heartfelt drive creates a better system for providers to care for patients. 
 In 2006 David Marx described a “Just Culture” in his Primer for Healthcare 
Executives.  As we evolved as an organization seven years into our journey, we 
recognized that we needed to instill a sense of individual accountability for our 
actions while understanding systems theory and the impact system flaws can 
have on a well meaning, attentive, informed practitioner in a complex, coupled 
environment.  We no longer used the term “blame-free.”  There were times when 
individuals would demonstrate reckless behavior.  This required discipline and 
we needed everyone to understand what our performance expectations were at 
AMH. 
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 David Marx helped us to bridge the links between the four evils.  First is 
human error which refers to what we should have done other than what did.  The 
second is negligence, the failure to exercise expected care which refers to what 
we should have been aware of substantial and unjustifiable risk.  The third is 
recklessness, the conscious disregard of substantial and unjustifiable risk.  The 
fourth is intentional rule violation or knowingly violating a rule or procedure (Marx 
2001, pg. 12). 
 Mr. Marx also differentiated between the three disciplinary decision-
making strategies.  Outcome-Based Disciplinary Decision-Making concerns 
much of our disciplinary decision making.  If a nurse makes an error and causes 
no harm, we consider her to be lucky.  If another nurse commits the same error 
resulting in injury, she is blameworthy (Marx, 2001, pg. 13).  This system is 
fundamentally flawed.  We can only control our intended behaviors but not 
always the outcome. 
 Rule-Based Disciplinary Decision Making involves high-risk industries 
where individuals are expected to follow rules, policies and procedures.  
Discipline can occur if one  violates a rule.  The FAA’s Aviation Safety Reporting 
System incents pilots to report all errors.  If reported, a pilot will not be disciplined 
for inadvertent violations.   The problem with rule-based disciplinary action is that 
there  will always be times where the rule does not fit circumstances the 
professional is facing.  Over time, people push the normative boundary of safe 
practice.  Violations of policy can be learning opportunities.  In a disciplinary 
model that takes action against intentional rule violation there will be little 
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learning about why people violated the rule.  Employees will, as a defensive 
measure, report they thought they were  following the rule (Marx 2001, pg. 15).  
Rule-based discipline is also flawed if we truly want to create safe systems for 
the future. 
 Risk-Based Disciplinary Decision-Making includes recklessness, a high-
crime demonstrating greater intent than  mere negligent conduct.  Unjustifiable 
risk should result in disciplinary action.  Even in a learning, reporting culture, 
reckless conduct is grounds for discipline as a deterrent to knowingly performing 
unsafe acts.   To develop an effective and robust reporting system employees 
and physicians need to understand how the information will be handled:  human 
error should not be disciplined, intentional rule violation should not be disciplined, 
reckless behavior should be disciplined, and for negligent behavior discipline 
depends on the circumstances. 
 Was the person aware or unaware of risk they were creating – the former 
may be cause for discipline and the latter should not be.  The balance between 
discipline to create deterrence and communication and enhanced reporting and 
learning needs to be carefully weighed (Marx, 2001, pg. 16).  The greater the 
reporting, the greater the opportunity for learning.  We at AMH have moved to 
learning vs. discipline for negligent behavior.  
 In all of these disciplinary decision-making models, only reckless behavior 
is cause for discipline at AMH.  Repeat reckless behavior is cause for 
termination. 
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 In 2007, we invited Sorrel King to be our patient safety lecturer.  Ms. King 
lost her daughter, Josie, when she was 18 months old.  Josie was being treated 
at Johns Hopkins Hospital for burns she received after accidentally stepping into 
a scalding tub at home.  Josie was responding well to treatment in the intensive 
care unit.  She was moved to an intermediate care unit and began to exhibit 
unusual symptoms:  sucking her washcloth, crying for every drink she saw.  
Despite her mother’s expressions of concern, caregivers overlooked or 
misinterpreted the child’s signs of dehydration.  She was given a narcotic despite 
the verbal order that she should receive no additional medications.  Josie died in 
2001, two days before she was expected to go home.  Sorrel and her husband 
were devastated by this seemingly senseless death of their daughter.  
Consumed with grief and anger they decided to channel their energy into the 
healthcare system.  When Johns Hopkins Hospital offered a financial settlement 
she asked them to take some of the money back to start a Children’s Safety 
program, and she created the Josie King Foundation to fund safety initiatives in 
other hospitals.  To hear Ms. King retell the story of her daughter’s death and to 
challenge hospital leadership about their role in patient safety was very powerful 
for all of us at AMH.  This was another call to action like the two watershed IOM 
reports.  This time it was not a think tank and years of research framing the 
importance of safety in hospitals, it was a mother who knew her daughter was 
struggling, no one listened to her and she lost her child. 
 Sorrel King believes it all comes back to communication.  People did not 
listen to her and they did not listen to each other.  Sorrel King joined our patient 
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safety rounds when she visited us in 2007.  She later posted a piece on her 
website.  She was connecting the dots, reinforcing her message to us – It All 
Comes Back to Communication (See Appendix B). 
 In 2008, we hosted Michael Leonard, MD at our patient safety lectureship.  
Dr. Leonard is an anesthesiologist who is the Physician Director of Patient Safety 
for Kaiser Permanente in Oakland, California.  Dr. Leonard is an expert in 
understanding the factors affecting clinicians in the care environment and a 
strong advocate for communication and team work.  Practicing medicine or 
nursing is complex, stressful work.  Team members support each other, help 
each other and effective teams produce better outcomes.  Multi-tasking, stress, 
fatigue degrade professionals’ performance.  Hospitals need to design 
safeguards to these conditions that increase the risk of error.   
 Dr. Leonard advocates for briefings before an operating room procedure 
and a debriefing after the procedure to communicate issues or concerns 
prospectively in the briefing and ways to improve in the debriefing:  what went 
well, what was difficult, what we could have done differently, and what we 
learned.  This kind of level playing field creates an environment where everyone 
in the operating room feels empowered to ask a question, contribute an idea, or 
voice a concern.  The results are impressive:  more communication equals less 
error, but the communication needs to be succinct and pertinent.  SBAR 
(Situation, Background, Assessment and Recommendation) is a way of 
organizing the briefings or communiqués.  Dr. Leonard offers this methodology 
as an effective communication tool (Groff, 2003). 
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 Dr. Leonard impressed upon us the importance of these communication 
techniques.  Although we had instituted SBAR and briefings, we had not 
hardwired it across our organization.  It was not institutionalized.  Our Center for 
Safety and Quality began a rigorous educational program that included the use of 
succinct educational briefings using the SBAR framework, which are routinely 
emailed to our entire organization.   
 Nursing handoffs are conducted in the SBAR format.  Unit briefings 
(huddles) are required to be held twice a day on each unit.  We have set a goal in 
FY 10 of increasing our briefing compliance from our current rate of 67% to 85%. 
 Dr. Leonard is a very smart, practical, and succinct patient safety 
advocate.  He understands how things work and he has a very practical 
approach to achieving breakthrough results.  As an educator, he always circles 
back to learnings and what can be retained by clinicians caring for patients.  One 
of the techniques being used in Kaiser’s primary care clinics is the Five Red 
Flags, which are the fundamental sources of risk.  They are different for each 
setting or each team, but some examples would be: 
− What are the five medications our patients are on that increase the risk of 
having a problem? 
− What are the five conditions that we cannot afford to miss in our clinic? 
− What are the five tests we cannot afford to lose? 
− What are the five ways that the ball gets dropped? 
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The Five Red Flags draw attention to what creates problems, causes risk, and 
creates a common mental model and safety net across the care continuum 
(Groff, 2003). 
 Our most recent patient safety lecturer was Craig Clapper who visited in 
2009.  Mr. Clapper is an expert on engineering  systems design.  Coming from 
the nuclear power industry, he has applied his knowledge of high reliability 
organizations (HROs) to transforming the safety culture in hospitals towards the 
journey to zero events of harm.  In 2008, the Healthcare Improvement 
Foundation, which we have been involved with since 2003, and the Regional 
Medication Safety Program for hospitals in the Delaware Valley invited Mr. 
Clapper’s organization, Healthcare Performance Improvement (HPI) to guide 
participating hospitals on their journey to zero events of harm.  AMH immediately 
agreed to participate and in fact pursued with Mr. Clapper the possibility of being 
one of the pilot hospitals.  In 2009, we began our work with HPI as one of the 
initial pilot hospitals.  Mr. Clapper was able to reinforce with all of our staff in his 
day of lectures and rounding at AMH the possibility of actually chasing zero 
errors with careful study and deliberate design of safe systems in a culture of 
caring and learning.  The collaborative is focused on creating and fostering a 
culture of safety where zero serious events are possible through the creation of a 
high reliability organization (HRO).  The HPI initiative capitalizes on all of the 
current, progressive thinking about creating a culture of safety.  There are many 
synergies with the IHI and their 100,000 Lives and 5 Million Lives Campaign 
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initiatives of 2004 and 2006, as well as with the recommendations of the two 
watershed IOM reports of 1999 and 2001. 
 AMH is at a very critical juncture in our journey to create a culture of safety 
with zero harm events.  For the past 10 years we have worked assiduously in a 
very deliberate fashion to embrace patient safety as a core value of our 
organization.   We aspire to be one of the safest hospitals in our country.  We 
have been inspired by gifted patient safety advocates and learned from patient 
safety experts some of whom are within our organization.  We have set very 
aggressive and extensive patient safety goals for our organization.  We have 
studied the literature, participated in appropriate collaboratives, traveled and 
visited other organizations in search of best practices.  Through our Innovator’s 
Circle Grants we have fostered creativity and innovation and have been 
recognized for our unique contributions nationally.  We have demonstrated 
significant commitment from the Board, leadership, medical staff, employees, 
and volunteers to patient safety as our number one priority and a core value for 
our organization.  We have built an infrastructure to support the execution of our 
comprehensive patient safety agenda.  We have educated and trained our staff.  
We have invested extensively in technology and information systems in support 
of patient safety initiatives.  We have raised funds from philanthropic individuals 
and granting organizations to improve patient safety at AMH.  And finally, we 
have never lost our focus on patient safety over the past 10 years despite the 
many other pressing issues in healthcare. 
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 All of this is very positive, but have we made a difference to our patients?   
Have we achieved measurable improvements?  Have we saved lives?  Have we 
reduced harm events?  All of our metrics have improved.  We rank in the top 
quartile of comparative databases for the Joint Commission Core Measures and 
National Patient Safety Goals.  We have successfully instituted all 12 IHI 
Campaign Measures.  We have reduced our mortality (not including hospice 
patients) significantly.  Our hospital acquired infections (HAIs) continue to 
decrease and our hand hygiene rates are above 80% compliance from a starting 
point 2 years ago of 30%.  More important than these results, we have created a 
small army of internal patient safety champions, some are even zealots, and we 
have created a Board that is focused and compulsive about its role in overseeing 
and supporting our patient safety agenda.  They care, they question, and they 
look for results. 
 AMH has always talked about its positive, can do culture as one of its 
strengths as a community teaching hospital.  Blending a culture of safety with the 
existing culture is our current focus.  What we want to create is an environment 
where everyone is comfortable challenging authority (leadership, medical staff 
and trustees) when it comes to our patients’ safety.  Safety culture needs to 
trump everything we do.  Our Chief of Staff and CNO have been very supportive 
of staff who question colleagues regarding safety or quality measures.  In fact, 
employees who ask questions or stop a procedure are thanked for their attention 
to detail regardless of whether they were correct or incorrect in their challenge.  
The gratitude is for their courage in speaking up.  For every 10 questions there 
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could be one near miss or error that is prevented.  Physicians who dismiss 
employees’ appropriate questions are counseled by our Chief of Staff about the 
need to respect everyone’s opinions and concerns when it comes to the safety of 
our patients. 
 I am very proud to be part of Abington Memorial Hospital’s journey to a 
culture of safety and our pursuit of zero preventable harm events.  The agenda is 
enormous, at times overwhelming and the journey continuous.  The agenda is 
also working, results are improving, patients are being treated in a safer 
environment, and the rewards are tremendous for patients and staff who are 
spared the personal trauma of being involved in a harm event.  I am grateful to all 
who have made our journey to date such a success.  We collectively recognize 
how much work still lies ahead of us but we are focused and energized about the 
opportunity to create a safer environment for our patients, their families, our 
medical staff and our employees.  
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